I’m headed back to Afghanistan and Pakistan at a critical juncture, which will shape Obama’s foreign-policy legacy.
The president will have to roll out his AfPak strategy very soon and explain it to the American public. His long review has fed the perception in South Asia that the United States is heading for the exit, which adds to the Taliban’s momentum.
Meantime, Afghans are to hold a runoff presidential election Saturday, after massive vote-rigging in the first round. This election, which President Hamid Karzai is expected to win, is deeply troubled. As of this writing, the opposition candidate, Abdullah Abdullah, was threatening to withdraw because of the flawed process. Until the balloting is over, no one will know whether Karzai is finally willing to tackle the massive corruption that has fueled Taliban gains.
And in coming weeks, we’ll see if the administration can improve its tense relationship with Pakistan, a nuclear-armed country in which jihadis are flourishing. The extent of our mutual mistrust was clear during Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s visit to Pakistan last week. She was harshly questioned by students and journalists suspicious of U.S. intentions; she in turn questioned how hard Pakistani officials had tried to shut down al-Qaeda havens.
Her query was a bit odd, since the Pakistani government has cooperated in efforts to decimate al-Qaeda, and Pakistan’s military is warring against some Pakistani Taliban groups near suspected al-Qaeda havens. But her blunt language reflected U.S. frustration at Pakistan’s reluctance to go after militants such as Afghan Taliban leaders and Pakistani jihadis who attack India over Kashmir.
Without an effective U.S.-Pakistani relationship, any AfPak strategy will fail.
So, in my travels, I’ll be looking at issues that will determine the success of Obama’s strategy — and will shape our relationships with Pakistanis and Afghans. Here are the issues in Afghanistan that I consider to be key:
Does our strategy permit us to plan a decent exit? What do I mean? Whatever Obama decides on troop levels, the goal must be to help Afghans reach the point where they can keep their own country stable. We must calm the country sufficiently, and for long enough, to train a larger Afghan army and develop “good enough” Afghan government services. Then, as in Iraq, we can draw down in an orderly way.
Do we know how to train a viable Afghan army? Afghans know how to fight. But there are unique problems in training an Afghan army that won’t get undercut by sectarian tensions caused by the undue influence of minority Tajiks linked to the Northern Alliance, the forces that helped defeat the Taliban. The army must also command the trust of majority Pashtuns, who live in the regions where the Taliban has the most strength.
Can we promote a national reconciliation strategy that will woo away mid- and low-level Taliban, and win over ambivalent tribal leaders? Karzai, if reelected, will present such a policy, as he has done before with little to show for it. U.S. officials have a team in place to reach out to tribal leaders; can they succeed?
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